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HOJ..D FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
NOON, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1§66
CCM..IE~CEMEN'f ..illDRE35

BY SENA1'0R ~~ MANSJ!'IELD (D . , MOI-."TANA)

Yeshiva University, New York City, New York
Thursday, June 16, 1966
10: 30 a .m.

VIET NAM AND CHINA
THE SHADO\ol OF WAR--THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE

I welcome the opportunity to share this day with the Class of

1966. For the most part, you are among the last to have been born during
Horld War II .

Hence, you are among the first to have received the pledge

of peace of the United Nations in 1945 .

The preamble to the Charter, you

will recall, contains this solemn statement of purpose:

"To save succeed-

ing generations from the scourge of war."
The pledge has stood for twenty-one years .

Commencement

addresses this year might well ponder the adequacy of its fulfillment .
It is a fitting theme for graduating classes, not only in the United
States, but in the Soviet Union, China, France, Britain, and elsewhere .
The Class of 1966 has been witness , since birth, not to a growing peace in the world, but to a procession of crises and conflicts .
This class has come to maturity in an atmosphere which for two decades
has been heavy with war and the threat of war.

This class graduates

directly into the face of the bitter war in Viet Nam.
Yet the words remain:
aeonrge of war. 11

"To save succeeding generations f rom the
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The detonation of the first atomic bomb gave to these words a
great fervor in 1945.
later.

The pledge is even more compelling two decades

Today, nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, are

stocked in the arsenals not only of the United States, but of the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, France and, perhaps now, China.
At this moment in time, peace is more than an ideal and a hope .
It is a universal and urgent human necessity.
The problem of peace is the great preoccupation of the President
and of the Senate .

It is a problem, unfortunately, which grows more, not

less, difficult with each passing day.

Indeed, with respect to Viet Nam,

we have scarcely begun to delineate the path to peace .

We have yet, after

extraordinary efforts, to begin to devise a formula for the resolution of
the conflict.
During the past year, the effort has been made to end the war
by waging more war and it has not succeeded.

For a time, the effort was

made to end the war by waging less war and that, too, did not succeed.
The President has pursued negotiations in public .
them in private.

He has searched for

He has sought a conference on peace on every highway

and by-way of international diplomacy.
But peace remains elusive .
not in sight .

The end of the war in Viet Nam is

The question of Viet Nam continues to command our most

persevering thought.

It continues to demand a most honest, restrained

and thorough public discussion .
We owe an unremitting search for a peaceful solution in Viet
Nam to the young Americans who have gone and who will go to that tortured
land.

We owe it to the Vietnamese people who have suffered from the war
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in great multitudes and beyond imagining.

We

~we

it to our individual

consciences and to the collective conscience of the nation.
Therefore, I address your attention, today, to the problem of
peace in Viet Nam.

I ask you to consider this problem in the context of

the limbo in which, for more than a decade and a half, have reposed the
relations between China and the United States .

The two questions--peace

in Viet Nam and peace with China-- are very closely interrelated, if not,
indeed, inseparable.
In a direct military sense, it is true that China is not presently
involved in Viet Nam.

vie have, in fact, bent every effort to assure the

Chinese that we mean them no harm and that we have no desire to share this
conflict in Viet Nam with them.

He have, in short, sought to avoid military

engagement with China and, except in accident, so far have avoided it .
Nevertheless, China is involved in Viet Nam.
tion is largely indirect, but it is

neverthel~ss

Chinese participa-

a real participation .

It

takes the form of encouragement of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front
in the south.

It includes the supply of war materials which are used

against Americans and other suppor ting assistance .
There is also already an element of direct Chinese participation
in Viet Nam.

Large Chinese labor battalions are at work along the overland

routes which come into North Viet Nam from China.

Americans have been shot

at and shot down by China, as the war in the air over North Viet Nam has
skirted the Chinese borders.
prevails .

That is the sort of involvement which already

There is every probability, moreover, that the longer the war

goes on, the greater will become the extent of Chinese participation . As
time goes on, an escalating war tends to take on its own relentlessness.
One-by- one the hatches of avoidance shut down for all concerned .
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If the Chinese are linked ever more tightly to the continuance
of the war in Viet Nam, it seems to me that they are also tied inextricably
to the question of peace in that nation and in Asia as a whole.
consider those matters, however, later in my remarks.
to the inner

p~oblems

Let me turn, first,

of Viet Nam.

Events of the past few weeks lend to the war an
ing ambiguityc

I shall

ai~

of bewilder-

It is not surp:::-ising that they engender a great deal of

confusion and uncertainty in this nation.
t-Ie

are engaged in war against the North Vietnamese, the Viet

Cong, and the National Liberation Front of the south. But the elements
of leadership in South Viet Nam who have the greatest stake in that effort
are engaged in a quasi-war amongst themselves.

This inner conflict has

produced pressures fo:::- instability in the south which have li't;tle to do
with the war in which we are engaged.

In the light of these pressures,

it is unrealistic to describe the situation in South Viet Nam in a clearcut ideological context.

It has never been, in fact, that kind of simple

situation.
To view the conflict as wholly one of an aggression of the north
against the south also does not do adequate justice to the perplexing
realities of Viet Nam.

The war is more than a clash between two nations

or hostile strangers.

It is also a rending of long associated cultures,

north, central and south, which contain relatives, friends and enemies
for whom the 17th parallel is a division of dubious significance and
durability.
It is illustrative, in this connection, to note that the leader
of North Viet Nam, Ho Chi Minh, was born much farther south in Viet Nam

- 5than the present lc&der of South Viet Nam, General Nguyen Cao Ky.

Ho Chi

Minh, the con:munist, was educated extensively in what is now ant:l-communist
South Viet Nam, while Nguyen Cao Ky, the anti-communist, received his training in what is now cctr.!!lunist North Viet Nam.
fused, think for a

m~ment

And if that les.ves you con-

what it must do to the Vietnamese people who must

live with the confUsion.
What I am suggesting by this digression is that while Viet Nam
may be two Rouses in conflict, it is at the same time one House not only
divided, but also united in many ways .

Hhe.t I am suggesting, too, is that

events of the past few weeks represent the surfacing of but a few of the
complex difficulties of the Vietnamese situation.
It seems to me that these difficulties have grown more intractable
and the solutions more difficult since the tragic assassination of President
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963,

Ccup has followed coup until the count has been lost.

In the process, the leadership of South Viet Nam has been sundered and
weakened, the rivalries have grown, the mutual antipathies have increased.
And, in the process, the Vietnamese people have suffered greatly in consequence of these developments as well as from the war.
In all frankness, so, too, has this nation suffered from these
developments.

The instability amongst the South Vietnamese leaders has

meant a steady increase in our involvement in Viet Nam, and especially
our military role.

There is no question that the Armed Services of the

United States have provided a growing margin of power without which a
Republic of Viet Nam could not have

sw.~vived.

To them has fallen the

task of filling the defensive gap left by the growing strains on the
South Vietnamese authorities .

On them has fallen the principal burden
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of meeting the increased military pressures from the north.

These tasks

which have been assigned to them by the nation's policies have been discharged with great dedication and at great personal sacrifice.
The increase in the American effort in Viet Nam has been and
will continue to be very costly.

During the past year and a half, our

ground forces commitment has grown from about 25,000 to 267,000.
end, this figure will be much higher.

By year's

The deployment of American naval

and air power has been of a very great magnitude.

It has brought to bear

on Viet Nam the impact of tens of thousands of additional highly trained
0en who have unleashed a level of destructive power which may approach or
even surpass that which was set loose during the Korean war.
At the beginning of 1965, the United States forces were incurring
casualties at the rate of about 6 per week.
are killed and wounded each week.

Now, upwards of 500 Americans

For the past five or six weeks in

succession, the casualty rate for Americans has surpassed that of the
South Vietnamese armed forces.
In monetary terms, the current cost of Viet Nam to the United
States has been estimated at an annual rate in the neighborhood of $13
billion and is continuing to rise .

In early 1965, the costs were perhaps

$1 or $2 billion.
I wish that I could tell you that this powerful injection of
American resources had brought the war nearer to a conclusion.
can only repeat what I said at the outset of my remarks: ,
war in Viet Nam is not in sight.

But I

the end of the

- 7-

It has been suggested of late--perhaps inferred is more accurate-that the war can be ended quickly by a further expansion of the American
military effort and, particularly, by more and better-placed bombing.
That is an appealing suggestion, and I have no doubt that it will be heard
more frequently between now and November.

It wraps up, in one simple

thought, a criticism of the present political leadership, a promise of a
less painful war, an expectation of victory at a relatively small increase
in cost.

In short, it suggests that there is an easy exist.

score one point, here, today:

Let us under-

There are easy ways to plunge more deeply

into this situation; there are no easy ways out of this situation.
I have just illustrated the extraordinary expansion of the
American military effort--including bombing--in the past year and a half.
Before going further along that path, it would seem to me that we have a
great responsibility to pause and, first, cons ider carefully the point to
which this path has led.

I can assure you that the politically responsible

leadership of the nation in the person of the President is not unmindful
of this responsibility.

There is, indeed, a most profound concern as to

where this course has led and where it may yet lead.
Hhen the sharp increase in the American military effort began
in early 1965, it was estimated that only about 400 North Vietnamese
soldiers were among the enemy forces in the south which totalled 140,000
at that time.

Today, the overall size of the enemy in the south has in-

creased to 250,000 of whom at least 30,000--a very conservative estimate-are considered to be North Vietnamese regulars.

One source suggests that

if local Viet Cong battalions which operate within their own provinces
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are excluded from the total, the northerners make up approximately onehalf of the disciplined professional enemy soldiers in South Viet Nam and
may well constitute two-thirds by year's end.
Shortly after the outset of the expansion of the military effort,
it was believed that about 1,500 North Vietnamese were crossing the border
each month.

Just a few months ago, the maximum potential infiltration was

thought to be about 4,500 per month .

But infiltration has recently been

reported in the press to be at a current rate well in excess of this figure.
The field of battle was confined largely to South Viet Nam when
the expansion of our military effort began.

Air and sea bombardment has

now extended the arena of conflict throughout almost all of North Viet
Nam.

The war has spread sharply into Laos .

More and more, it verges on

Cambodia and threatens to spill over into Thailand .

And as I have already

mentioned, American planes have been shot at and shot down on or across
the borders of China.
vfuatever constructive achievement has resulted from this expansion, the fact must also be faced that the search for peace by intensification of war has begotten, not peace, but a further intensification of war.
The expansion of the arena of conflict has yielded, not peace, but further
expansion of the arena of conflict .
Is the war, then, to continue to intensify?

Is Viet Nam--north

and south- -to be reduced to a charnel house amidst smoking, silent ruins?
Indeed, is that to be the fate of great areas of Southeast Asia and regions
be~nd?
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Expe:ience requires us to recognize that this danger exists in
the conflict.

Prudence compels us to recognize, moreover, that the

terminal point may not be reached until and unless the war has involved
China directly.

That possibility, it seems to me, should be faced sooner

rather than later .

"'tle

should examine it, now, while there is yet time to

examine it in good sense and soberness.

~·le

should examine it, now, rather

than wait until the actuality is confr onted in the heat of some accident,
miscalculation or misunderstanding or at the end of that long drift which
ends in inescapable military convergence .
Certainly, the experience of Korea counsels us to examine this
question without delay and, in so doing, to lay aside the distorting prism
of wishful thinking.

It will be recalled that a war between Koreans--

north and south--a decade and a half ago, became in the end what few
expected at the beginning.
United States and China.

It became, substantially, a war between the
And you will r ecall, too, that in the end peace

was not restored to Korea by victory but by a truce which required the
agreement of the United States and China.
The question must be asked here as well as in Peking .
be asked now.

It must

Can peace be restored in Southeast Asia, as it was not in

Northeast Asia, before, rather than after, a military clash?

Can there

be a turning off from the course of collision and onto the road of settlement before, rather than after, the crash?
I can give you no assurances on these questions .

The acswers

depend not only on our wdsdom and restraint but also on that of the
Chinese .

I can only stress to you that the relentless search for affirma-

tive answers is a most solemn responsibility which rests especially upon
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the

leadersh ~p

of this

na~ion

and of China but concerns also the United

Nations, the Geneva powers, and the entire world.
There is little doubt that this search is
hiatus in United States relations with China.

hamoe~ed

by the long

It is a decade and a half

since the Chinese revolution and the Korean conflict which followed it.
In all these

yea~s,

little of consequence was done to close the deep void

which these shattering events blasted between the peoples of the two nations.
On the contrary, the seeds of hostility and suspicion were scattered widely
and in both countries .

The weeis of a mutual distrust were encouraged to

grow high in both countries. The direct human contact between the world's
most populous nation and the world ' s most powerful was reduced to formal
and routine meetings in Warsaw between an

Amer ~can

and a Chinese Ambassador

,.,hich, over the years, have averaged out to about one a month.
In the last few weeks members of the Administracion have sought
to make clear in public statements that this nation seeks to restore some
"bridges" to China.

That is a helpful initiative .

It is also useful to

lower our rigid self-imposed travel and other barriers which the Executive
Branch is now doing .
These acts accord with the nation's interest and they are most
certainly meaningful gestures in the direction of peace .

That the Chinese

greet these efforts with unabated hostility does not change their validity.
In the present state of Chinese-United States relations, all acts are
suspect .

All doubts are magnified . All fears are exaggerated.

These

acts, nevertheless, remain proper and modest acts which may one day
redound to the benefit of both nations,.

That :l.s all they are and they

ought not to be regarded as anything moreo
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They do not, cei'tainly, go to the co:::-e of the cun·ent danger
which lies in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia.

Indeed, the relevance of these

acts must necessarily remain dubious, at least until that danger is faced
and begins to abate.
Ylliat is needed most, at this time and in the light of that danger,
is an initiative for a direct contact between the Peking government and
our own government on the problem of peace in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia.
This problem is of such transcendent importance, it seems to me, that it
is a fit question for face-to-face discussion between China and the United
States at the highest practicable level.

Our Secretary of State, Dean

Rusk, confronted the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, across the
Conference tab!e at Geneva in 1961-62.

It may be that a similar meeting

now would be useful in this critical situation.
The meeting

co~ld

be confined to the two nations, or it could

include all the belligerents in Viet Nam.

It could include the nations

of the Southeast Asian mainland since they all lie in the swath of the
war's spreading devastation.

It seems to me

tb~t

there are many possible

and acceptable alternatives insofar as participation and arrangement are
concerned .
The membership and mechanics of the conference are not key issues.
History will not be gentle with those who pursue the shadow and evade the
substance of peace.

It will not view with sympathy those who stand too

much on ceremony or who i nsist too much on face as the price of coming to
grips with its profound problems.
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An Asian conference, at this time, cannot draw a distinction
between victor and vanquished in this conflict, any more than it was
possible to do so in the Korean settlement . All win by peace; all lose
by the war's continuance.
vfuat a conference at this time must be concerned with is, in
the first instance, a curb on the expansion of the war and a prompt and
durable termination of the tragic bloodletting in Viet Nam.
It must be concerned with insuring a choice free of coercion
of any kind to the people of South Viet Nam ovar their future and on the
question of the reunification of Viet Nam.
It must be concerned with how the independence and the territorial
integrity, not only of Viet Nam, but of other small nations of Southeast
Asia can be safeguarded in peace .
It must be concarned, finally, with how foreign bases and
foreign military forces can be promptly withdrawn and excluded from
Viet Nam and other parts of the Southeast Asian mainland.
These are fundamental questions .
must begin to be found .

Answers to these questions

And, in the l ast analysis, they must be con-

curred in by China and the United States .

Those are the essentials if

the conflict in Vi et Nam is to end and if a reasonable and stable peace
is to be established in Southeast Asia.
Let me make clear that I am not sanguine as to the possibilitie3
that these questions will be faced in conference in the near future .

Even

less is it to be expected that answers to these questions are going to be
found very quickly.

The chasms are deep.

The walls are high.
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Nevertheless, at some point, these questions will have to be
faced and answers will have to be found.

It seems to me that we must

continue to try to take those first faltering steps toward peace in Asia.
We must try to take them, now, before the tragedy, which is Viet Nam, is
compounded many times over.
on the Chinese .

That is the great responsibility.

It rests on this nation.

nations of the world.

It rests

It rests, finally, on all the

